By Elham Saeidinezhad
The COVID-19 crisis has created numerous risks for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The only certainty for SMEs has been that the government’s support has been too flawed to mitigate the shock. The program’s crash is not an accident. As mentioned in the previous Money View blog, one of the PPP loan design flaws is the government’s reliance on banks to act traditionally and intermediate credit to SMEs. Another essential, yet not well-understood design flaw at the heart of the PPP loan program is its ambiguity about the secondary market. The structure I propose to resolve such uncertainty focuses on the explicit government guarantee for the securitization of the PPP loans, similar to the GSE’s role in the mortgage finance system.
Such flaws are the byproduct of the central bank’s tendency to isolate shadow banking, and its related activities, from traditional banking. These kinds of bias would not exist in the “Money View” framework, where shadow banking is a function rather than an entity. “Money market funding of capital market lending” is a business deal that can happen in the balance sheet of any entity- including banks and central banks. One way to identify a shadow banker from a traditional banker is to focus on their sources and uses of finance. A traditional banker is simply a credit intermediary. Her alchemy is to facilitate economic growth by bridging any potential mismatch between the kind of liabilities that borrowers want to issue (use of finance) and the nature of assets that creditors want to hold (source of funding). Nowadays, the mismatch between the preferences of borrowers and the preferences of lenders is increasingly resolved by “price changes” in the capital market, where securities are traded, rather than by traditional intermediation. Further, banks are reluctant to act as a financial intermediary for retail depositors as they have already switched to their more lucrative role as money market dealers.
To understand the government pandemic stimulus program for the SMEs, let’s start by understanding the PPP loan structure. The U.S. Treasury, along with financial regulators such as the Fed, adopted two measures to facilitate aid to SMEs under the CARES Act. First, the Fed announced the formation of the Paycheck Protection Program Loan Facility (the “PPPLF”). This program enables insured depository institutions to obtain financing from the Fed collateralized by Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans. The point to emphasize here is that the Fed, in essence, is the ultimate financier of such loans as banks could use the credits to SMEs as collateral to finance their lending from the Fed. Second, PPP loans are assigned a zero-percent risk-weight for purposes of U.S. risk-based capital requirements. This feature is essentially making PPP loans exempt from risk-based (but not leverage) capital requirements when held by a banking organization subject to U.S. capital requirements.
Despite the promising appearance of such programs, the money is not flowing towards SMEs. One of the deadly flaws of this program is that it overlooks the importance of the secondary market. Specifically, ambiguity exists regarding the Small Business Administration (SBA)’s role in the secondary market due to the nature of the PPP loans and how they are regulated. The CARES Act provides that PPP loans are a traditional form of the SBA guaranteed loan. Such a statement implies that the PPP loans would not be 100% guaranteed in the secondary market as the SBA guaranteed loans are subject to certain conditions that should be satisfied by the borrower. First, the SBA wants to ensure that the entity claiming a right to payment from the SBA holds a valid title to the SBA loan. Second, the SBA requires the borrower to fulfill the PPP’s forgiveness requirements. Securitization requires the consent of the SBA. What is not mentioned in the CARES Act is that the SBA’s existing regulations restrict the ability of such loans to be transferred in the secondary market. Such restrictions block the credit to flow to the SMEs.
Under such circumstances, free transfer of PPPs in the secondary market could result in chaos when the PPP loans are later presented to the SBA by the holder for forgiveness or guarantee. Some might propose to ask for approval from the SBA before the securitization process. Yet, prior approval requirements for loan transfers, even though it might reduce the confusion mentioned above, hinder the ability to transfer newly originated PPP loans into the secondary market. Given that the PPP entails a massive amount of loans – $349 billion – to be originated in a short period, transfer restrictions could have a material impact on the ability to get much-needed funding to small businesses quickly. The program’s failure to notice such a conflict is a byproduct of the government’s tendency to ignore the role of the secondary market in the success of programs that aims at providing credit to retail depositors.
A potential solution would be for a government agency, such as the Small Business Administration (SBA), to guarantee the PPP loans in the secondary market in the same manner as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do for the mortgage loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (the GSEs) that purchase mortgages from banks and use securitization to enhance the flow of credit in the mortgage market. The GSEs help the flow of credit as they have a de facto subsidy from the government. The market believes that the government will step in to guarantee their debt if they become insolvent. For the case of the PPP loans, instead of banks keeping the loans on their balance sheet until the loan was repaid, the bank who made the loan to the SMEs (the originator) should be able to sell the loan to the SBA. The SBA then would package the PPP loans and sells the payment rights to investors. The point to emphasize here is that the government both finance such loans in the primary market- the Fed accepts the PPP loans as collateral from banks- and ensures the flow of credit by securitizing them in the secondary market. Such a mechanism provides an unambiguous and ultimate guarantee for the PPP loans in the credit market that the government aims at offering anyways. This kind of explicit government guarantee could also help the smooth flow of credit to SMEs, which has been the original goal of the government in the first place.
Money View, through its recognition of banks as money market dealers in market-based finance and originators of securitized assets, could shed some light on the origins of those complications. Previously in the Money View blog, I proposed a potential solution to circumvent banks and directly injecting credit to the SMEs, through tools such as central bank digital currencies (CBDC). In this piece, the proposal is to adopt the design of the mortgage finance system to provide unambiguous government support and resolve the perplexities regarding marketing PPP loans in the secondary market. Until this confusion is resolved, banking entities with regulatory or internal funding constraints may be unwilling to originate PPP loans without a clear path for obtaining financing or otherwise transferring such credits into the secondary market. Such failures come at the expense of retail depositors, including small businesses.
Acknowledgment: Writing this piece would not be possible without a fruitful exchange that I had with Dr. Rafael Lima Sakr, a Teaching Fellow at Edinburgh Law School.