COVID-19 – Page 2 – Love Thinking about Finance, Monetary Economics, and Money View

Derivatives Market as the Achilles’ Heel of the Fed’s Interventions

By Elham Saeidinezhad

Some describe the global financial crisis as a “Minsky’s moment” when credit’s inherent instability was exposed for everyone to see. The COVID-19 turmoil, on the other hand, is a “Mehrling’s moment” since his Money View provided us a unique framework to evaluate the Fed’s responses in action. Over the past couple of months, a new crisis, known as COVID-19, has grown up to become the most widespread shock after the 2008-09 global financial crisis. COVID-19 crisis has sparked historical reactions by the Fed. In essence, the Fed has become the creditor of the “first” resort in the financial market. These interventions evolved swiftly and encompassed several roles and tools of the Fed (Table 1). Thus, it is crucial to measure their effectiveness in stabilizing the financial market.

In most cases, economists assessed these actions by studying the change in size or composition of the Fed’s balance sheet or the extent and the kind of assets that the Fed is supporting. In a historic move, for instance, the Fed is backstopping commercial papers and municipal bonds directly. However, once we use the model of “Market-Based Credit,” proposed by Perry Mehrling, it becomes clear that these supports exclude an essential player in this system, which is derivative dealers. This exclusion might be the Achilles’ heel of the Fed’s responses to the COVID-19 crisis.

What system of central bank intervention would make sense if the COVID-19 crisis significantly crushed the market-based credit? This piece employs Perry Mehrling’s stylized model of the market-based credit system to think about this question. Table 1 classifies the Fed’s interventions based on the main actors in this model and their function. These players are investment banks, asset managers, money dealers, and derivative dealers. In this financial market, investment banks invest in capital market instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities (ABS). To hedge against the risks, they hold derivatives such as Interest Rate Swaps (IRS), Foreign exchange Swaps (FXS), and Credit Default Swaps (CDS). The basic idea of derivatives is to create an instrument that separates the sources of risk from the underlying assets to price (or even sell) them separately. Asset managers, which are the leading investors in this economy, hold these derivatives. Their goal is to achieve their desired risk exposure and return. From the balance sheet perspective, the investment bank is the asset manager’s mirror image in terms of both funding and risk.

This framework highlights the role of intermediaries to focus on liquidity risk. There are two different yet equally critical financial intermediaries in this model—money dealers, such as money market mutual funds, and derivative dealers. Money dealers provide dollar funding and set the price of liquidity in the money market. In other words, these dealers transfer the cash from the investors to finance the securities holdings of investment banks. The second intermediary is the derivative dealers. In derivatives such as CDS, FXS, and IRS, these market makers transfer risk from the investment bank to the asset manager and set the price of risk in the process. They mobilize the risk capacity of asset managers’ capital to bear the risk in the assets such as MBS.

After the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed has backstopped all these actors in the market-based credit system, except the derivative dealers (Table 1). The lack of Fed’s support for the derivatives market might be an immature decision. The modern market-based credit system is a collateralized system. There should be a robust mechanism for shifting both assets and the risks to make this system work. The Fed has employed extensive measures to support the transfer of assets essential for the provision of funding liquidity. Financial participants use assets as collaterals to obtain funding liquidity by borrowing from the money dealers. However, during a financial crisis, this mechanism only works if a stable market for risk transfer accompanies it. It is the job of derivative dealers to use their balance sheets to transfer risk and make a market in derivatives. The problem is that fluctuations in the price of assets that derive the derivatives’ value expose them to the price risk.

During a crisis such as COVID-19 turmoil, the heightened price risks lead to the system-wide contraction of the credit. This occurs even if the Fed injects an unprecedented level of liquidity into the system. If the value of assets falls, the investors should make regular payments to the derivative dealers since most derivatives are mark-to-market. They make these payments using their money market deposit account or money market mutual fund (MMMFs). The derivative dealers then use this cash inflow to transfer money to the investment bank that is the ultimate holder of these instruments. In this process, the size of assets and liabilities of the global money dealer (or MMMFs) shrinks, which leads to a system-wide credit contraction.

As a result of the COVID-19 crisis, derivative dealers’ cash outflow is very likely to remain higher than their cash inflow. To manage their cash flow, derivative dealers derive the “insurance” prices up and further reduce the price of capital or assets in the market. This process further worsens the initial problem of falling asset prices despite the Fed’s massive asset purchasing programs. The critical point to emphasize here is that the mechanism through which the transfer of the collateral, and the provision of liquidity, happens only works if fluctuations in the value of assets are absorbed by the balance sheets of both money dealer and derivative dealers. Both dealers need continuous access to liquidity to finance their balance sheet operations.

Traditional lender of last resort is one response to these problems. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed has backstopped the global money dealer and asset managers and supported continued lending to investment banking. Fed also became the dealer of last resort by supporting the asset prices and preventing the demand for additional collateral by MMMFs. However, the Fed has left derivative dealers and their liquidity needs behind. Importantly, two essential actions are missing from the Fed’s recent market interventions. First, the Fed has not provided any facility that could ease derivative dealers’ funding pressure when financing their liabilities. Second, the Fed has not done enough to prevent derivative dealers from demanding additional collaterals from asset managers and other investors, to protect their positions against the possible future losses.

The critical point is that in market-based finance where the collateral secures funding, the market value of collateral plays a crucial role in financial stability. This market value has two components: the value of the asset and the price of underlying risks. The Fed has already embraced its dealer of last resort role partially to support the price of diverse assets such as asset-backed securities, commercial papers, and municipal bonds. However, it has not offered any support yet for backstopping the price of derivatives. In other words, while the Fed has provided support for the cash markets, it overlooked the market liquidity in the derivatives market. The point of such intervention is not so much to eliminate the risk from the market. Instead, the goal is to prevent a liquidity spiral from destabilizing the price of assets and so, consequently, undermining their use as collateral in the market-based credit.

To sum up, shadow banking has three crucial foundations: market-based credit, global banking, and modern finance. The stability of these pillars depends on the price of collateral (liquidity), price of Eurodollar (international liquidity), and the price of derivatives (risk), respectively. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed has backstopped the first two dimensions through tools such as the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, and Central Bank Swap Lines. However, it has left the last foundation, which is the market for derivatives, unattended. According to Money View, this can be the Achilles’ heel of the Fed’s responses to the COVID-19 crisis.

Download Table: Fed’s responses to the Covid-19 Crisis: A Money View Classification (As of March 25, 2020) (Pdf document)Download

Download Table: Fed’s responses to the Covid-19 Crisis: A Money View Classification (As of March 25, 2020) (Word document) Download

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This piece was originally part of “Special Edition Roundtable: Money in the Time of Coronavirus” by JustMoney.org platform.

By Elham Saeidinezhad

The coronavirus crisis has sparked different policy responses from different countries. The common thread among these reactions is that states are putting globalization on pause. Yet, re-establishment of central bank swap lines is making “money,” chiefly Eurodollars, the first element that has become more global in the wake of the Coronavirus outbreak. This is not an unexpected phenomenon for those of us who are armed with insights from the Perry Mehrling’s “Money View” framework. The fact that the monetary system is inherently international explains why the Fed reinstalled its standing U.S. dollar liquidity swap line arrangements with five other central banks just after it lowered its domestic federal fund’s target to zero percent. However, the crisis also forces us to see global dollar funding from a lens closer to home: the fact that the Eurodollar market, at its core, is a domestic macro-financial linkage. In other words, its breakdown is a source of systemic risk within communities as it disrupts the two-way connection between the real economy and the financial sector. This perspective clarifies the Fed’s reactions to the crisis in hand. It also helps us understand the recent debate in the economics profession about the future of central bank tools.

The Great Financial Crisis of 2008-09 confirmed the vital importance of advancing our understanding of macro-financial linkages. The Coronavirus crisis is testing this understanding on a global scale. Most of the literature highlights the impact of sharp fluctuations in long-term fundamentals such as asset prices and capital flows on the financial positions of firms and the economy. In doing so, economists underestimate the effects of disturbances in the Eurodollar market, which provides short-term dollar funding globally, on real economic activities such as trade. These miscalculations, which flow from economists’ natural approach to money as a veil over the real economy, could be costly. Foreign banks play a significant role in the wholesale Eurodollar market to raise US dollar financing for their clients. These clients, usually multinational corporations, are part of a global supply chain that covers different activities from receiving an order to producing the final goods and services. Depending on their financial positions, these firms either wish to hold large dollar balances or receive dollar-denominated loans. The deficit firms use the dollar funding to make payments for their purchases. The surplus firms, on the other hand, expect to receive payments in the dollar after selling their products. The interconnectedness between the payment system and global supply chains causes the Eurodollar market to act as a bridge between the real economy and the financial sector.

The Coronavirus outbreak is putting a strain on this link, both domestically and globally: it is disrupting the supply chain, forcing every firm along the chain to become a deficit agent in the process. The supply chain moves products or services from one supplier to another and is essentially the sum of all firms’ sales. These sales (revenues) are, in effect, a measure of payments, the majority of which occur in the Eurodollar market. A sharp shock to sales, as a result of the outbreak, precipitates a lower ability to make payments. When an output is not being shipped, a producer of final goods in China does not have dollar funding to pay the suppliers of intermediate products. As a result, firms in other countries do not have dollars either. The trauma that the coronavirus crisis injects into manufacturing and other industries thus lead to missed payments internationally. Missed payments will make more firms become deficit agents. This includes banks, which are lower down in the hierarchy, and the central banks, which are responsible for relaxing the survival constraints for the banking system. By focusing on the payments system and Eurodollar market, we are able to see the “survival constraint” in action.

The question for monetary policy is how far central banks decide to relax that survival constraint by lowering the bank rate. This is why central banks, including the Fed, are reducing interest rates to zero percent. However, the ability to relax the survival constraint for banks further down in the hierarchy depends also on the strength of foreign central banks to inject dollar funding into their financial system. The Fed has therefore re-established the dollar swap line with five other major central banks. The swap lines are available standing facilities and serve as a vital liquidity backstop to ease strains in global funding markets. The point to hold on to here is that the U.S. central bank is at a level in the hierarchy above other central banks

Central banks’ main concern is about missed payments of U.S. dollars, as they can deal with missed payments in local currency efficiently. In normal circumstances, the fact that non-U.S. central banks hold foreign exchange reserves enables them to intervene in the market seamlessly if private FX dealers are unable to do so. In these periods, customer-led demand causes some banks to have a natural surplus position (more dollar deposits than loans) and other banks to have an inherent deficit position (more dollar loans than deposits). FX dealers connect the deficit banks with the surplus banks by absorbing the imbalances into their balance sheets. Financial globalization has enabled each FX dealer to resolve the imbalance by doing business with some U.S. banks, but it seems more natural all around for them to do business with each other. During this crisis, however, even U.S. banks have started to feel the liquidity crunch due to the negative impacts of the outbreak on financial conditions. When U.S. banks pull back from market-making in the Eurodollar market, there will be a shortage of dollar funding globally. Traditionally, in these circumstances, foreign central banks assume the role of the lender of last resort to lend dollars to both banks and non-banks in their jurisdiction. However, the severity of the Coronavirus crisis is creating a growing risk that such intermediation will fracture. This is the case as speculators and investors alike have become uncertain of the size of foreign central banks’ dollar reserve holding.

To address these concerns, the Fed has re-established swap lines to lend dollars to other central banks, which then lend it to banks. These particular swap lines arrangements were originally designed to help the funding needs of banks during 2008. However, these swap lines might be inadequate to ease the tension in the market. The problem is that the geographic reach of the swap lines is too narrow. The Fed has swap lines only with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. The reason is that the 2008-09 financial crisis affected many banks in these particular jurisdictions severely and their economies were closely intertwined with the US financial system. But the breadth of the current crisis is more extensive as every country along the supply chain is struggling to get dollars. In other words, the Fed’s dollar swap lines should become more global, and the international hierarchy needs to flatten.

To ease the pressure of missed payments internationally, and prevent the systemic risk outbreak domestically, the Fed and its five major central bank partners have coordinated action to enhance the provision of liquidity via the standing U.S. dollar liquidity swap line arrangements. These tools help to mitigate the effects of strains on the supply chain, both domestically and abroad. Such temporary agreements have been part of central banks’ set of monetary policy instruments for decades. The main lessons from the Coronavirus outbreak for central bank watchers is that swap lines and central bank collaborations are here to stay – indeed, they should become more expansive than before. These operations are becoming a permanent tool of monetary policy as financial stability becomes a more natural mandate of the central banks. As Zoltan Pozsar has recently shown, the supply chain of goods and services is the reverse of the dollar funding payment system. Central banks’ collaboration prevents this hybridity from becoming a source of systemic risk, both domestically and internationally.

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Update: On March 19, 2020, the Fed announced the establishment of temporary U.S. dollar liquidity arrangements with other central banks such as Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Danmarks Nationalbank (Denmark), the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Norges Bank (Norway), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden).