By Elham Saeidinezhad
Liquidity transformation is a crucial function for many banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. It is a balance sheet operation where the firm creates liquid liabilities financed by illiquid assets. However, liquidity transformation is a risky operation. For policymakers and macroeconomists, the main risk is to financial stability caused by systemic liquidation of assets, also called “firesale.” In this paper, I emphasize an essential characteristic of firesale that is less explored—the order of liquidation. The order of liquidation refers to the sequence at which financial assets are converted into cash or cash equivalents- when the funds face significant cash outflow. Normally, economists explain assets’ order of liquidation by using theories of capital structure. However, the financial market episodes, such as March 2020 “Cash for Dash,” have revealed that firms’ behaviors are not in line with the predictions of such classical theories. Capital structure theories, such as “Pecking Order” and “Trade-off,” argue that fund managers should use their cash holding as the first line of defense during a liquidity crunch before selling their least liquid asset. In contrast to such prophecies, during the recent financial turmoil, funds liquidated their least liquid assets, even US Treasuries, first, before unhoarding their cash and cash equivalents. In this paper, I explore a few reasons that generated the failure of these theories when explaining funds’ behavior during a liquidity crisis. I also explain why Money View can be used to build an alternative framework.
Traditional capital structure theories such as pecking order differentiate financial assets based on their “adverse selection” and “information costs” rather than their “liquidity.” The pecking order theory is from Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Since it is famous, I will be brief. Assume that there are two funding sources available to firms whenever they hit their survival constraint: cash (or retained earnings) and securities (including debt and equity). Cash has no “adverse selection” problem, while securities, primarily equity, are subject to serious adverse selection problems. Compared to equity, debt securities have only a minor adverse selection problem. From the point of view of an external investor, equity is strictly riskier than debt. Both have an adverse selection risk premium, but that premium is significant on equity. Therefore, an outside investor will demand a higher rate of return on equity than on debt. From the perspective of the firm’s managers, the focus of our paper, cash is a better source of funds than is securities. Accordingly, the firm would prefer to fund all its payments using “cash” if possible. The firm will sell securities only if there is an inadequate amount of cash.
In the trade-off theory, another popular conventional capital structure theory, a firm’s decision is a trade-off between tax-advantage and capital-related costs. In a world that firms follow trade-off theory, their primary consideration is a balance between bankruptcy cost and tax benefits of debt. According to this approach, the firm might optimize its financing strategies, including whether to make the payments using cash or securities, by considering tax and bankruptcy costs. In most cases, these theories suggest that the firms prefer to use their cash holdings to meet their financial obligations. They use securities as the first resort only if the tax benefit of high leverage exceeds the additional financial risk and higher risk premiums. The main difference between pecking order theory and trade-off theory is that while the former emphasizes the adverse selection costs, the latter highlights the high costs of holding extra capital. Nonetheless, similar to the pecking order theory, the trade-off theory predicts that firms prefer to use their cash buffers rather than hoarding them during a financial crisis.
After the COVID-19 crisis, such predictions became false, and both theories underwent a crisis of their own. A careful examination of how funds, especially intermediaries such as Money Market Funds, or MMFs, adjusted their portfolios due to liquidity management revealed that they use securities rather than cash as the first line of defense against redemptions. Indeed, such collective behavior created the system-wide “dash for cash” episode in March 2020. On that day, few funds drew down their cash buffers to meet investor redemptions. However, contrary to pecking order and trade-off theories, most funds that faced redemptions responded by selling securities rather than cash. Indeed, they sold more of the underlying securities than was strictly necessary to meet those redemptions. As a result, these funds ended March 2020 with higher cash levels instead of drawing down their cash buffers.
Such episodes cast doubt on the conventional theories of capital structure for liquidity management, which argues that funds draw on cash balances first and sell securities only as a last resort. Yet, they align with Money View’s vision of the financial hierarchy. Money View asserts that during the financial crisis, preservation of cash, the most liquid asset located at the top of the hierarchy, will be given higher priority. During regular times, the private dealing system conceals such priorities. In these periods, the private dealing system uses its balance sheets to absorb trade imbalances due to the change in preferences to hold cash versus securities. Whenever the demand for cash exceeds that of securities, the dealers maintain price continuity by absorbing the excess securities into their balance sheets. Price continuity is a characteristic of a liquid market in which the bid-ask spread, or difference between offer prices from buyers and requested prices from sellers, is relatively small. Price continuity reflects a liquid market. In the process, they can conceal the financial hierarchy from being in full display.
During the financial crisis, this hierarchy will be revealed for everyone to see. In such periods, the dealers cannot or are unwilling to use their job correctly. Due to the market-wide pressing need to meet payment obligations, the trade imbalances show up as an increased “qualitative” difference between cash and securities. In the course of this differentiation, there is bound to be an increase in the demand for cash rather than securities, a situation similar to the “liquidity trap.” A liquidity trap is a situation, described in Keynesian economics, in which, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers holding cash rather than holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In this environment, investors would prefer to reduce the holding of their less liquid assets, including US Treasuries, before using their cash reserves to make their upcoming payments. Thus, securities will be liquidated first, and cash will be used only as a last resort.
The key to understanding such behaviors by funds is recognizing that the difference in the quality of the financial instruments’ issuers creates a natural hierarchy of financial assets. This qualitative difference will be heightened during a crisis and determines the capital structure of the funds, and the “order of liquidation” of the assets, for liquidity management purposes. When the payments are due and liquidity is scarce, firms sell illiquid assets ahead of drawing down the cash balances. In the process, they disrupt money markets, including repo markets, as they put upward pressure on the price of cash in terms of securities. Thus, during a crisis, the liability of the central banks becomes the most attractive asset to own. On the other hand, securities, the IOUs of the private sector, become the less desirable asset to hold for asset managers.
So why do standard theories of capital structure fail to explain firms’ behavior during a liquidity crisis? First, they focus on the “fallacious” type of functions and costs during a liquidity crunch. While the dealers’ “market-making” function and liquidity are at the heart of Money View, the standard capital structure theories stress the “financial intermediation” and “adverse selection costs.” In this world, the “ordering” of financial assets to be liquidated may stem from sources such as agency conflicts and taxes. For Money View, however, what determines the order of firesaled assets, and the asset managers’ portfolio is less the agency costs and more the qualitative advantage of one asset than another. The assets’ status determines such qualitative differences in the financial hierarchy. By disregarding the role of dealers, standard capital structure models omit the important information that the qualitative difference between cash and credit will be heightened, and the preference will be changed during a crisis.
Such oversight, mixed with the existing confusion about the non-bank intermediaries’ business model, will be fatal for understanding their behavior during a crisis. The difficulty is that standard finance theories assume that non-bank intermediaries, such as MMFs, are in the business of “financial intermediation,” where the risk is transferred from security-rich agents to cash-rich ones. Such an analysis is correct at first glance. However, nowadays, the mismatch between the preferences of borrowers and the preferences of lenders is increasingly resolved by price changes rather than by traditional intermediation. A careful review of the MMFs balance sheets can confirm this viewpoint. Such examination reveals that these funds, rather than transforming the risks, “pool” them. Risk transformation is a defining characteristic of financial intermediation. Yet, even though it appears that an MMF is an intermediary, it is mainly just pooling risk through diversification and not much transforming risk.
Comprehending the MMF’s business as pooling the risks rather than transforming them is essential for understanding the amount of cash they prefer to hold. The MMF shares have the same risk properties as the underlying pool of bonds or stocks by construction. There is some benefit for the MMF shareholders from diversification. There is also some liquidity benefit, perhaps because open-end funds typically promise to buy back shares at NAV. But that means that MMFs have to keep cash or lines of credit for the purpose, even though it will lower their return and increase the costs for the shareholders.
Finally, another important factor that drives conventional theories’ failure is their concern about the cash flow patterns in the future and the dismissal of the cash obligations today. This is the idea behind the discounting of future cash flows. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC), generally used in these theories, is at the heart of discounting future cash flows. In finance, discounted cash flow analysis is a method of valuing security, project, company, or asset using the time value of money. Discounted cash flow analysis is widely used in investment finance, real estate development, corporate financial management, and patent valuation. In this world, the only “type” of cash flow that matters is the one that belongs to a distant future rather than the present, when firms should make today’s payments. On the contrary, the present, not the future, and its corresponding cash flow patterns, is what Money View is concerned about. In Money View’s world, the firm should be able to pay its daily obligations. If it does not have continuous access to liquidity and cannot meet its cash commitments, there will be no future.
The pecking order theory derives much of its influence from a view that it fits naturally with several facts about how companies use external finance. Notably, this capital structure theory derives support from “indirect” sources of evidence such as Eckbo (1986). Whenever the theories are rejected, the conventional literature usually attributes the problem to cosmetic factors, such as the changing population of public firms, rather than fundamental ones. Even if the pecking order theory is not strictly correct, they argue that it still does a better job of organizing the available evidence than other theories. The idea is that the pecking order theory, at its worst, is the generalized version of the trade-off theory. Unfortunately, none of these theories can explain the behavior of firms during a crisis, when firms should rebalance their capital structure to manage their liquidity needs.
The status of classical theories, despite their failures to explain different crises, is symptomatic of a hierarchy in the schools of economic thought. Nonetheless, they are unable to provide strong capital structure theories as they focus on fallacious premises such as the adverse selection or capital costs of an asset. To build theories that best explain the financing choices of corporates, economists should emphasize the hierarchical nature of financial instruments that reliably determines the order of liquidation of financial assets. In this regard, Money View seems to be positioned as an excellent alternative to standard theories. After all, the main pillars of this framework are financial hierarchy, dealers, and liquidity management.