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Forget About the “Corona Bond.” Should the ECB Purchase Eurozone Government Bond ETFs?

By Elham Saeidinezhad

In recent history, one of a few constants about the European Union (EU) is that it follows the U.S. footstep after any disaster. After the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed expanded the scope and duration of the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) to ease the fiscal conditions of the states and the cities. The facility enables lending to states and municipalities to help manage cash flow stresses caused by the coronavirus pandemic. In a similar move, the ECB expanded its support for the virus-hit EU economies in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Initiatives such as Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) allow the ECB to open the door to buy Greek sovereign bonds for the first time since the country’s sovereign debt crisis by announcing a waiver for its debt. 

There the similarity ends. While the market sentiment about the Fed’s support program for municipals is very positive, a few caveats in the ECB’s program have made the Union vulnerable to a market run. Fitch has just cut Italy’s credit rating to just above junk. The problem is that unlike the U.S., the European Union is only a monetary union, and it does not have a fiscal union. The investors’ prevailing view is that the ECB is not doing enough to support governments of southern Europe, such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, who are hardest hit by the virus. Anxieties about the Union’s fiscal stability are behind repeated calls for the European Union to issue common eurozone bonds or “corona bond.” Yet, the political case, especially from Northern European countries, is firmly against such plans. Further, despite the extreme financial needs of the Southern countries, the ECB is reluctant to lift its self-imposed limits not to buy more than a third of the eligible sovereign bonds of any single country and to purchase sovereign bonds in proportion to the weight of each country’s investment in its capital. This unwillingness is also a political choice rather than an economic necessity.

It is in that context that this piece proposes the ECB to include the Eurozone government bond ETF to its asset purchasing program. Purchasing government debts via the medium of the ETFs can provide the key to the thorny dilemma that is shaking the foundation of the European Union. It can also be the right step towards creating a borrowing system that would allow poorer EU nations to take out cheap loans with the more affluent members guaranteeing the funds would be returned. The unity of EU members faces a new, painful test with the coronavirus crisis. This is why the Italian Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte warned that if the bloc fails to stand up to it, the entire project might “lose its foundations.” The ECB’s decision to purchase Eurozone sovereign debt ETFs would provide an equal opportunity for all the EU countries to meet the COVID-19 excessive financial requirements at an acceptable price. Further, compared to the corona bond, it is less politically incorrect and more common amongst the central bankers, including those at the Fed and the Bank of Japan.

In the index fund ecosystem, the ETFs are more liquid and easier to trade than the basket of underlying bonds. What lies behind this “liquidity transformation” is the different equilibrium structure and the efficiency properties in markets for these two asset classes. In other words, the dealers make markets for these assets under various market conditions. In the market for sovereign bonds, the debt that is issued by governments, especially countries with lower credit ratings, do not trade very much. So, the dealers expect to establish long positions in these bonds. Such positions expose them to the counterparty risk and the high cost of holding inventories. Higher price risk and funding costs are correlated with an increase in spreads for dealers. Higher bid-ask spreads, in turn, makes trading of sovereign debt securities, especially those issued by countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, more expensive and less attractive.

On the contrary, the ETFs, including the Eurozone government bond ETFs, are considerably more tradable than the underlying bonds for at least two reasons. First, the ETF functions as the “price discovery” vehicle because this is where investors choose to transact. The economists call the ETF a price discovery vehicle since it reveals the prices that best match the buyers with the sellers. At these prices, the buying and selling quantities are just in balance, and the dealers’ profitability is maximized. According to Treynor Model, these “market prices” are the closest thing to the “fundamental value” as they balance the supply and demand. Such an equilibrium structure has implications for the dealers. The make markers in the ETFs are more likely to have a “matched book,” which means that their liabilities are the same as their assets and are hedged against the price risk. The instruments that are traded under such efficiency properties, including the ETFs, enjoy a high level of market liquidity.

Second, traders, such as asset managers, who want to sell the ETF, would not need to be worried about the underlying illiquid bonds. Long before investors require to acquire these bonds, the sponsor of the ETF, known as “authorized participants” will be buying the securities that the ETF wants to hold. Traditionally, authorized participants are large banks. They earn bid-ask spreads by providing market liquidity for these underlying securities in the secondary market or service fees collected from clients yearning to execute primary trades. Providing this service is not risk-free. Mehrling makes clear that the problem is that supporting markets in this way requires the ability to expand banks’ balance sheets on both sides, buying the unwanted assets and funding that purchase with borrowed money. The strength of banks to do that on their account is now severely limited. Despite such balance sheet constraints, by acting as “dealers of near last resort,” banks provide an additional line of defense in the risk management system of the asset managers. Banks make it less likely for the investors to end up purchasing the illiquid underlying assets.

That the alchemists have created another accident in waiting has been a fear of bond market mavens and regulators for several years. Yet, in the era of COVID-19, the alchemy of the ETF liquidity could dampen the crisis in making by boosting virus-hit countries’ financial capacity. Rising debt across Europe due to the COVID-19 crisis could imperil the sustainability of public finances. This makes Treasury bonds issued by countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy less tradable. Such uncertainty would increase the funding costs of external bond issuance by sovereigns. The ECB’s attempt to purchase Eurozone government bonds ETFs could partially resolve such funding problems during the crisis. Further, such operations are less risky than buying the underlying assets.

Some might argue the ETFs create an illusion of liquidity and expose the affluent members of the ECB to an unacceptably high level of defaults by the weakest members. Yet, at least two “real” elements, namely the price discovery process and the existence of authorized participants who act as the dealers of the near last resort, allows the ETFs to conduct liquidity transformation and become less risky than the underlying bonds. Passive investing sometimes is called as “worse than Marxism.” The argument is that at least communists tried to allocate resources efficiently, while index funds just blindly invest according to an arbitrary benchmark’s formula. Yet, devouring capitalism might be the most efficient way for the ECB to circumvent political obstacles and save European capitalism from itself.

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Elham's Money View Blog Search For Stable Liquidity Providers Series

In a World Where Banks Do Not Aspire to be Intermediaries, Is It Time to Cut Out the Middlemen? (Part I)

This Piece Is Part of the “Search For Stable Liquidity Providers” Series.

By Elham Saeidinezhad

“Bankers have an image problem.” Marcy Stigum

Despite the extraordinary quick and far-reaching responses by the Fed and US Treasury, to save the economy following the crisis, the market sentiment is that “Money isn’t flowing yet.” Banks, considered as intermediaries between the government and troubled firms, have been told to use the liberated funds to boost financing for individuals and businesses in need. However, large banks are reluctant, and to a lesser extent unable, to make new loans even though regulators have relaxed capital rules imposed in the wake of the last crisis. This paradox highlights a reality that has already been emphasized by Mehrling and Stigum but erred in the economic orthodoxy.

To understand this reluctance by the banks, we must preface with a careful look at banking. In the modern financial system, banks are “dealers” or “market makers” in the money market rather than intermediaries between deficit and surplus agents. In many markets such as the UK and US, these government support programs are built based on the belief that banks are both willing and able to switch to their traditional role of being financial intermediaries seamlessly. This intermediation function enables banks to become instruments of state aid, distributing free or cheap lending to businesses that need it, underpinned by government guarantees.  This piece (Part l) uses the Money View and a historical lens to explain why banks are not inspired anymore to be financial intermediaries. In Part ll, we are going to propose a possible resolution to this perplexity. In a financial structure where banks are not willing to be financial intermediaries, central banks might have to seriously entertain the idea of using central bank digital currency (CBDC) during a crisis. Such tools enable central banks to circumvent the banking system and inject liquidity directly to those who need it the most.

Stigum once observed that bankers have, at times, an image problem. They are seen as the culprits behind the high-interest rates that borrowers must pay and as acting in ways that could put the financial system and the economy at risk, perhaps by lending to risky borrowers, when interest rates are low. Both charges reflect the constant evolution in banks’ business models that lead to a few severe misconceptions over the years. The first delusion is about the banks’ primary function. Despite the common belief, banks are not intermediaries between surplus and deficit agents anymore. In this new system, banks’ primary role is to act as dealers in money market securities, in governments, in municipal securities, and various derivative products. Further, several large banks have extensive operations for clearing money market trades for nonbank dealers. A final important activity for money center banks is foreign operations of two sorts: participating in the broad international capital market known as the Euromarket and operating within the confines of foreign capital markets (accepting deposits and making loans denominated in local currencies). 

Structural changes that have taken place on corporates’ capital structure and the emergence of market-based finance have led to this reconstruction in the banking system. To begin with, the corporate treasurers switched sources of corporate financing for many corporates from a bank loan to money market instruments such as commercial papers. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when rates were high, and quality-yield spreads were consequently wide, firms needing working capital began to use the sale of open market commercial paper as a substitute for bank loans. Once firms that had previously borrowed at banks short term were introduced to the paper market, they found that most of the time, it paid them to borrow there. This was the case since money obtained in the credit market was cheaper than bank loans except when the short-term interest rate was being held by political pressure, or due to a crisis, at an artificially low level.

The other significant change in market structure was the rise of “money market mutual funds.” These funds provide more lucrative investment opportunities for depositors, especially for institutional investors, compared to what bank deposits tend to offer. This loss of large deposits led bank holding companies to also borrow in the commercial paper market to fund bank operations. The death of the deposits and the commercial loans made the traditional lending business for the banks less attractive. The lower returns caused the advent of the securitization market and the “pooling” of assets, such as mortgages and other consumer loans. Banks gradually shifted their business model from a traditional “originate-and-hold” to an “originate-to-distribute” in which banks and other lenders could originate loans and quickly sell them into securitization pools. The goal was to increase the return of making new loans, such as mortgages, to their clients and became the originators of securitized assets.

The critical aspect of these developments is that they are mainly off-balance sheet profit centers. In August 1970, the Fed ruled that funds channeled to a member bank that was raised through the sale of commercial paper by the bank’s holding company or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries were subject to a reserve requirement. This ruling eliminated the sale of bank holding company paper for such purposes. Today, bank holding companies, which are active issuers of commercial paper, use the money obtained from the sale of such paper to fund off-balance sheet, nonbank, activities. Off-balance sheet operations do not require substantial funding from the bank when the contracts are initiated, while traditional activities such as lending must be fully funded. Further, most of the financing of traditional activities happens through a stable base of money, such as bank capital and deposits. Yet, borrowing is the primary source of funding off-balance sheet activities.

To be relevant in the new market-based credit system, and compensate for the loss of their traditional business lines, the banks started to change their main role from being financial intermediaries to becoming dealers in money market instruments and originators of securitized assets. In doing so, instead of making commercial loans, they provide liquidity backup facilities on commercial paper issuance. Also, to enhance the profitability of making consumer loans, such as mortgages, banks have turned to securitization business and have became the originators of securitized loans. 

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak, the Fed, along with US Treasury, has provided numerous liquidity facilities to help illiquid small and medium enterprises. These programs are designed to channel funds to every corner of the economy through banks. For such a rescue package to become successful, these banks have to resume their traditional financial intermediary role to transfer funds from the government (the surplus agents) to SMEs (the deficit agents) who need cash for payroll financing. Regulators, in return, allow banks to enjoy lower capital requirements and looser risk-management standards. On the surface, this sounds like a deal made in heaven.

In reality, however, even though banks have received regulatory leniency, and extra funds, for their critical role as intermediaries in this rescue package, they give the government the cold shoulder. Banks are very reluctant to extend new credits and approve new loans. It is easy to portray banks as villains. However, a more productive task would be to understand the underlying reasons behind banks’ unwillingness. The problem is that despite what the Fed and the Treasury seem to assume, banks are no longer in the business of providing “direct” liquidity to financial and non-financial institutions. The era of engaging in traditional banking operations, such as accepting deposits and lending, has ended. Instead, they provide indirect finance through their role as money market dealers and originators of securitized assets.

In this dealer-centric, wholesale, world, banks are nobody’s agents but profits’. Being a dealer and earning a spread as a dealer is a much more profitable business. More importantly, even though banks might not face regulatory scrutiny if these loans end up being nonperforming, making such loans will take their balance sheet space, which is already a scarce commodity for these banks. Such factors imply that in this brave new world, the opportunity cost of being the agent of good is high. Banks would have to give up on some of their lucrative dealing businesses as such operation requires balance sheet space. This is the reason why financial atheists have already started to warn that banks should not be shamed into a do-gooder lending binge.

Large banks rejected the notion that they should use their freed-up equity capital as a basis for higher leverage, borrowing $5tn of funds to spray at the economy and keep the flames of coronavirus at bay. Stigum once said that bankers have an image problem. Having an image problem does not seem to be one of the banks’ issues anymore. The COVID-19 crisis made it very clear that banks are very comfortable with their lucrative roles as dealers in the money market and originators of assets in the capital market, and have no intention to be do-gooders as financial intermediaries. These developments could suggest that it is time to cut out banks as middlemen. To this end, central bank digital currency (CBDC) could be a potential solution as it allows central banks to bypass banks to inject liquidity into the system during a period of heightened financial distress such as the COVID-19 crisis.

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Should the Fed Add FX Swaps to its Asset Purchasing Programs?

By Elham Saeidinezhad and Jack Krupinski*

“As Stigum reminded us, the market for Eurodollar deposits follows the sun around the globe. Therefore, no one, including and especially the Fed, can hide from its rays.”

The COVID-19 crisis renewed the heated debate on whether the US dollar could lose its status as the world’s dominant currency. Still, in present conditions, without loss of generality, the world reserve currency is the dollar. The exorbitant privilege implies that the deficit agents globally need to acquire dollars. These players probably have a small reserve holding, usually in the form of US Treasury securities. Still, more generally, they will need to purchase dollars in a global foreign exchange (FX) markets to finance their dollar-denominated assets. One of the significant determinants of the dollar funding costs that these investors face is the cost of hedging foreign exchange risk. Traditionally, the market for the Eurodollar deposits has been the final destination for these non-US investors. However, after the great financial crisis, investors have turned to a particular, and important segment of the FX market, called the FX swap market, to raise dollar funding. This shift in the behavior of foreign investors might have repercussions for the rates in the US money market.

The point to emphasize is that the price of Eurodollar funding, used to discipline the behavior of the foreign deficit agents, can affect the US domestic money market. This usage of FX swap markets by foreign investors to overcome US dollar funding shortages could move short-term domestic rates from the Fed’s target range. Higher rates could impair liquidity in US money markets by increasing the financing cost for US investors. To maintain the FX swap rate at a desirable level, and keep the Fed Funds rate at a target range, the Fed might have to include FX derivatives in its asset purchasing programs.

The use of the FX swap market to raise dollar funding depends on the relative costs in the FX swap and the Eurodollar market. This relative cost is represented in the spread between the FX swap rate and LIBOR. The “FX swap-implied rate” or “FX swap rate” is the cost of raising foreign currency via the FX derivatives market. While the “FX swap rate” is the primary indicator that measures the cost of borrowing in the FX swap market, the “FX-hedged yield curve” represents that. The “FX-hedged yield curve” adjusts the yield curve to reflect the cost of financing for hedged international investors and represents the hedged return. On the other hand, LIBOR, or probably SOFR in the post-LIBOR era, is the cost of raising dollar directly from the market for Eurodollar deposits.

In tranquil times, arbitrage, and the corresponding Covered Interest Parity condition, implies that investors are indifferent in tapping either market to raise funding. On the contrary, during periods when the bank balance sheet capacity is scarce, the demand of investors shifts strongly toward a particular market as the spread between LIBOR and FX swap rate increases sharply. More specifically, when the FX swap rate for a given currency is less than the cost of raising dollar directly from the market for Eurodollar deposits, institutions will tend to borrow from the FX swap market rather than using the money market. Likewise, a higher FX swap rate would discourage the use of FX swaps in financing.

By focusing on the dollar funding, it is evident that the FX swap market is fundamentally a money market, not a capital market, for at least two reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of the market is short-term. Second, it determines the cost of Eurodollar funding, both directly and indirectly, by providing an alternative route of funding. It is no accident that since the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, indicators of dollar funding costs in foreign exchange markets, including “FX swap-implied rate”, have risen sharply, approaching levels last seen during the great financial crisis. During crises, non-US banks usually finance their US dollar assets by tapping the FX swap market, where someone borrows dollars using FX derivatives by pledging another currency as collateral. In this period, heightened uncertainty leads US banks that face liquidity shortage to hoard liquid assets rather than lend to foreigners. Such coordinated decisions by the US banks put upward pressure on FX swap rates.

The FX swap market also affects the cost of Eurodollar funding indirectly through the FX dealers. In essence, most deficit agents might acquire dollars by relying entirely on the private FX dealing system. Two different types of dealers in the FX market are typical FX dealers and speculative dealers. The FX dealer system expedites settlement by expanding credit. In the current international order, the FX dealer usually has to provide dollar funding. The dealer creates a dollar liability that the deficit agent buys at the spot exchange rate using local currency, to pay the surplus country. The result is the expansion of the dealer’s balance sheet and its exposure to FX risk. The FX risk, or exchange risk, is a risk that the dollar price of the dealer’s new FX asset might fall. The bid-ask spread that the FX dealer earns reflects this price risk and the resulting cost of hedging.

As a hedge against this price risk, the dealer enters an FX swap market to purchase an offsetting forward exchange contract from a speculative dealer. As Stigum shows, and Mehrling emphasizes, the FX dealer borrows term FX currencies and lends term dollars. As a result of entering into a forward contract, the FX dealer has a “matched book”—if the dollar price of its new FX spot asset falls, then so also will the dollar value of its new FX term liability. It does, however, still face liquidity risk since maintaining the hedge requires rolling over its spot dollar liability position until the maturity of its term dollar asset position. A “speculative” dealer provides the forward hedge to the FX dealer. This dealer faces exposure to exchange risk and might use a futures position, or an FX options position to hedge. The point to emphasize here is that the hedging cost of the speculative dealer affects the price that the normal FX dealer faces when entering a forward contract and ultimately determines the price of Eurodollar funding. 

The critical question is, what connects the domestic US markets with the Euromarkets as mentioned earlier? In different maturity ranges, US and Eurodollar rates track each other extraordinarily closely over time. In other words, even though spreads widen and narrow, and sometimes rates cross, the main trends up and down are always the same in both markets. Stigum (2007) suggests that there is no doubt that this consistency in rates is the work of arbitrage.

Two sorts of arbitrages are used to link US and Eurodollar rates, technical and transitory. Opportunities for technical arbitrage vanished with the movement of CHIPS to same-day settlement and payment finality. Transitory arbitrages, in contrast, are money flows that occur in response to temporary discrepancies that arise between US and Eurodollar rates because rates in the two markets are being affected by differing supply and demand pressures. Much transitory arbitrage used to be carried on by banks that actively borrow and lend funds in both markets. The arbitrage that banks do between the domestic and Eurodollar markets is referred to as soft arbitrage. In making funding choices, domestic versus Eurodollars, US banks always compare relative costs on an all-in basis.

But that still leaves open the question of where the primary impetus for rate changes typically comes from. Put it differently, are changes in US rates pushing Eurodollar rates up and down, or vice versa? A British Eurobanker has a brief answer: “Rarely does the tail wag the dog. The US money market is the dog, the Eurodollar market, the tail.” The statement has been a truth for most parts before the great financial crisis. The fact of this statement has created a foreign contingent of Fed watchers. However, the direction of this effect might have reversed after the great financial crisis.  In other words, some longer-term shifts have made the US money market respond to the developments in the Eurodollar funding.

This was one of the lessons from the US repo-market turmoil. On Monday, September 16, and Tuesday, September 17, Overnight Treasury general collateral (GC) repurchase-agreement (repo) rates surprisingly surged to almost 10%. Two factors made these developments extraordinary: First, the banks, who act as a dealer of near last resort in this market due to their direct access to the Fed’s balance sheets, did not inject liquidity. Second, this time around, the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR), which is replacing LIBOR to measure the cost of Eurodollar financing, also increased significantly, leading the Fed to intervene directly in the repo market.

Credit Suisse’ Zoltan Poszar points out that an increase in the supply of US Treasuries along with the inversion in the FX-hedged yield of Treasuries has created such anomalies in the US money market.  Earlier last year, an increase in hedging costs caused the inversion of a curve that represents the FX-hedged yield of Treasuries at different maturities. Post- great financial crisis, the size of foreign demands for US assets, including the US Treasury bonds, increased significantly. For these investors, the cost of FX swaps is the primary factor that affects their demand for US assets since that hedge return, called FX-hedged yield, is an important component of total return on investment. This FX-hedged yield ultimately drives investment decisions as hedge introduces an extra cash flow that a domestic bond investment does not have. This additional hedge return affects liquidity considerations because hedging generates its own cash flows.

The yield-curve inversion disincentivizes foreign investors, mostly carry traders, trying to earn a margin from borrowing short term to buy Treasuries (i.e., lending longer-term). Demand for Eurodollars—which are required by deficit agents to settle payment obligations—is very high right now, which has caused the FX Swap rate-LIBOR spread to widen. The demand to directly raise dollars through FX swaps has driven the price increase, but this also affects investors who typically use FX swaps to hedge dollar investments. As the hedge return falls (it is negative for the Euro), it becomes less profitable for foreign investors to buy Treasury debt. More importantly, for foreign investors, the point at which this trade becomes unprofitable has been reached way before the yield curve inverted, as they had to pay for hedging costs (in yen or euro). This then forces Treasuries onto the balance sheets of primary dealers and have repercussions in the domestic money market as it creates balance sheet constraints for these large banks. This constraint led banks with ample reserves to be unwilling to lend money to each other for an interest rate of up to 10% when they would only receive 1.8% from the Fed.

This seems like some type of “crowding out,” in which demand for dollar funding via the FX swap has driven up the price of the derivative and crowded out those investors who would typically use the swap as a hedging tool. Because it is more costly to hedge dollar investments, there is a risk that demand for US Treasuries will decrease. This problem is driven by the “dual-purpose” of the FX swaps. By directly buying this derivative, the Fed can stabilize prices and encourage foreign investors to keep buying Treasuries by increasing hedge return. Beyond acting to stabilize the global financial market, the Fed has a direct domestic interest in intervening in the FX market because of the spillover into US money markets.

The yield curve that the Fed should start to influence is the FX-hedged yield of Treasuries, rather than the Treasury yield curve since it encompasses the costs of US dollar funding for foreigners. Because of the spillover of FX swap turbulences to the US money markets, the FX swap rate will influence the US domestic money market. If we’re right about funding stresses and the direction of effects, the Fed might have to start adding FX swaps to its asset purchasing program. This decision could bridge the imbalance in the FX swap market and offer foreign investors a better yield. The safe asset – US Treasuries – is significantly funded by foreign investors, and if the FX swap market pulls balance sheet and funding away from them, the safe asset will go on sale. Treasury yields can spike, and the Fed will have to shift from buying bills to buying what matters– FX derivatives. Such ideas might make some people- especially those who believe that keeping the dollar as the world’s reserve currency is a massive drag on the struggling US economy and label the dollar’s international status as an “an exorbitant burden,”- uncomfortable. However, as Stigum reminded us, the market for Eurodollar deposits follows the sun around the globe. Therefore, no one, including and especially the Fed, can hide from its rays.

*Jack Krupinski is a student at UCLA, studying Mathematics and Economics. He is pursuing an actuarial associateship and is working to develop a statistical understanding of risk. Jack’s economic research interests involve using the “Money View” and empirical methods to analyze international finance and monetary policy.

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Is COVID-19 Crisis a “Mehrling’s Moment”?

Derivatives Market as the Achilles’ Heel of the Fed’s Interventions

By Elham Saeidinezhad

Some describe the global financial crisis as a “Minsky’s moment” when credit’s inherent instability was exposed for everyone to see. The COVID-19 turmoil, on the other hand, is a “Mehrling’s moment” since his Money View provided us a unique framework to evaluate the Fed’s responses in action. Over the past couple of months, a new crisis, known as COVID-19, has grown up to become the most widespread shock after the 2008-09 global financial crisis. COVID-19 crisis has sparked historical reactions by the Fed. In essence, the Fed has become the creditor of the “first” resort in the financial market. These interventions evolved swiftly and encompassed several roles and tools of the Fed (Table 1). Thus, it is crucial to measure their effectiveness in stabilizing the financial market.

In most cases, economists assessed these actions by studying the change in size or composition of the Fed’s balance sheet or the extent and the kind of assets that the Fed is supporting. In a historic move, for instance, the Fed is backstopping commercial papers and municipal bonds directly. However, once we use the model of “Market-Based Credit,” proposed by Perry Mehrling, it becomes clear that these supports exclude an essential player in this system, which is derivative dealers. This exclusion might be the Achilles’ heel of the Fed’s responses to the COVID-19 crisis. 

What system of central bank intervention would make sense if the COVID-19 crisis significantly crushed the market-based credit? This piece employs Perry Mehrling’s stylized model of the market-based credit system to think about this question. Table 1 classifies the Fed’s interventions based on the main actors in this model and their function. These players are investment banks, asset managers, money dealers, and derivative dealers. In this financial market, investment banks invest in capital market instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities (ABS). To hedge against the risks, they hold derivatives such as Interest Rate Swaps (IRS), Foreign exchange Swaps (FXS), and Credit Default Swaps (CDS). The basic idea of derivatives is to create an instrument that separates the sources of risk from the underlying assets to price (or even sell) them separately. Asset managers, which are the leading investors in this economy, hold these derivatives. Their goal is to achieve their desired risk exposure and return. From the balance sheet perspective, the investment bank is the asset manager’s mirror image in terms of both funding and risk.

This framework highlights the role of intermediaries to focus on liquidity risk. There are two different yet equally critical financial intermediaries in this model—money dealers, such as money market mutual funds, and derivative dealers. Money dealers provide dollar funding and set the price of liquidity in the money market. In other words, these dealers transfer the cash from the investors to finance the securities holdings of investment banks. The second intermediary is the derivative dealers. In derivatives such as CDS, FXS, and IRS, these market makers transfer risk from the investment bank to the asset manager and set the price of risk in the process. They mobilize the risk capacity of asset managers’ capital to bear the risk in the assets such as MBS.  

After the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed has backstopped all these actors in the market-based credit system, except the derivative dealers (Table 1). The lack of Fed’s support for the derivatives market might be an immature decision. The modern market-based credit system is a collateralized system. There should be a robust mechanism for shifting both assets and the risks to make this system work. The Fed has employed extensive measures to support the transfer of assets essential for the provision of funding liquidity. Financial participants use assets as collaterals to obtain funding liquidity by borrowing from the money dealers. However, during a financial crisis, this mechanism only works if a stable market for risk transfer accompanies it. It is the job of derivative dealers to use their balance sheets to transfer risk and make a market in derivatives. The problem is that fluctuations in the price of assets that derive the derivatives’ value expose them to the price risk.

During a crisis such as COVID-19 turmoil, the heightened price risks lead to the system-wide contraction of the credit. This occurs even if the Fed injects an unprecedented level of liquidity into the system. If the value of assets falls, the investors should make regular payments to the derivative dealers since most derivatives are mark-to-market. They make these payments using their money market deposit account or money market mutual fund (MMMFs). The derivative dealers then use this cash inflow to transfer money to the investment bank that is the ultimate holder of these instruments. In this process, the size of assets and liabilities of the global money dealer (or MMMFs) shrinks, which leads to a system-wide credit contraction. 

As a result of the COVID-19 crisis, derivative dealers’ cash outflow is very likely to remain higher than their cash inflow. To manage their cash flow, derivative dealers derive the “insurance” prices up and further reduce the price of capital or assets in the market. This process further worsens the initial problem of falling asset prices despite the Fed’s massive asset purchasing programs. The critical point to emphasize here is that the mechanism through which the transfer of the collateral, and the provision of liquidity, happens only works if fluctuations in the value of assets are absorbed by the balance sheets of both money dealer and derivative dealers. Both dealers need continuous access to liquidity to finance their balance sheet operations.

Traditional lender of last resort is one response to these problems. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed has backstopped the global money dealer and asset managers and supported continued lending to investment banking. Fed also became the dealer of last resort by supporting the asset prices and preventing the demand for additional collateral by MMMFs. However, the Fed has left derivative dealers and their liquidity needs behind. Importantly, two essential actions are missing from the Fed’s recent market interventions. First, the Fed has not provided any facility that could ease derivative dealers’ funding pressure when financing their liabilities. Second, the Fed has not done enough to prevent derivative dealers from demanding additional collaterals from asset managers and other investors, to protect their positions against the possible future losses. 

The critical point is that in market-based finance where the collateral secures funding, the market value of collateral plays a crucial role in financial stability. This market value has two components: the value of the asset and the price of underlying risks. The Fed has already embraced its dealer of last resort role partially to support the price of diverse assets such as asset-backed securities, commercial papers, and municipal bonds. However, it has not offered any support yet for backstopping the price of derivatives. In other words, while the Fed has provided support for the cash markets, it overlooked the market liquidity in the derivatives market. The point of such intervention is not so much to eliminate the risk from the market. Instead, the goal is to prevent a liquidity spiral from destabilizing the price of assets and so, consequently, undermining their use as collateral in the market-based credit.

To sum up, shadow banking has three crucial foundations: market-based credit, global banking, and modern finance. The stability of these pillars depends on the price of collateral (liquidity), price of Eurodollar (international liquidity), and the price of derivatives (risk), respectively. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed has backstopped the first two dimensions through tools such as the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, and Central Bank Swap Lines. However, it has left the last foundation, which is the market for derivatives, unattended. According to Money View, this can be the Achilles’ heel of the Fed’s responses to the COVID-19 crisis. 

Download Table: Fed’s responses to the Covid-19 Crisis: A Money View Classification (As of March 25, 2020) (Pdf document)Download
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Is “Tokenisation” Our Apparatus Towards a Dealer Free Financial Market?

By Elham Saeidinezhad

The death of the Jimmy Stewart style “traditional banking system” was accelerated by the birth of securitization in the financial market. Securitization made the underlying assets, such as mortgage loans, “tradable” or “liquid.” Most recently, however, a new trend, called “tokenization,” i.e., the conversion of securities into digital tokens, is emerging that is decidedly different from the earlier development. While securitization created a dealer centric system of market-based credit that raise funds from investors, tokenization is a step towards building a “dealer free” world that reduces fees for investors. In this world, dealers’ liquidity provision is replaced by “smart” or “self-executing” contracts, protocols, or code that self-execute when certain conditions are met. The absence of dealers in this structure is not consequential in standard times. When markets are stable, people assume the mechanical convertibility of the tokenized asset into its underlying securities. However, the financial crisis threatens this confidence in the convertibility principle and could lead to massive settlement failures. These systemic failures evaporate liquidity and create extensive adjustments in asset prices. Such an outcome will be responded by policymakers who try to limit these adverse feedback loops. But the critical question that is remained to be answered is the central banks will save whom and which, not a very smart contract.

New technologies created money and assets. For centuries, these assets, mostly short-term commercial papers, were without liquidity and relied upon the process of “self-liquidation.” However, the modern financial market, governed by the American doctrine, improved this outdated practice and relied on “shiftability” or “market liquidity” instead. Shiftability (or salability) of long-term financial securities ensured that these assets could be used to meet cash flow requirements, or survival constraints, before their maturity dates. The primary providers of liquidity in this market are security dealers who use their balance sheets to absorb trade imbalances. The triumph of shiftability view, because of depression and war, has given birth to the “asset-backed securities” and securitization. This process can encompass any financial asset and promotes liquidity in the marketplace.

ABS market continues to evolve into new securitization deals and more innovative offerings in the future. Tokenization is the next quantum leap in asset-based securitization. Tokenization refers to the process of issuing a blockchain token that digitally represents a real tradable asset such as security. This process, in many ways, is like the traditional securitization with a twist. The “self-executing” feature of these contracts discount the role of dealers and enable these assets to be traded in secondary markets by automatically matching buyers with sellers. The idea is that eliminating dealers will increase “efficiency” and reduce trading costs. 

The issue is that digital tokens may be convertible to securities, in the sense that the issuer of digital tokens holds some securities on hand, but that does not mean that these tokenized assets represent securities or are at the same hierarchical level as them. When an asset (such as a digital token) is backed by another asset (such as security), it is still a promise to pay. The credibility of these promises is an issue here, just as in the case of other credit instruments, and the liquidity of the tokenized instruments can help to enhance credibility. In modern market-based finance, which is a byproduct of securitization, the state of liquidity depends on the security dealers who take the imbalances into their balance sheets and provide market liquidity. 

The only constant in this evolving system is the natural hierarchy of money. Tokenization disregards this inherent feature of finance and aims at moving towards a dealer free world. A key motivation is to create a “super asset” by lowering the estimated $17–24 billion spent annually on trade processing. The problem is that by considering dealers as “frictions” in the financial market, tokenization is creating a super asset with no liquidity during the financial crisis. Such shiftability ultimately depends on security dealers and other speculators who are willing to buy assets that traders are willing to sell and vice versa and use their balance sheets when no one else in the market does. Tokenization could jeopardize the state of liquidity in the system by bypassing the dealers in the name of increasing efficiency. 

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Promises All the Way Down: A Primer on the Money View

This post is originally part of a symposium on the Methods of Political Economy in Law and Political Economy Blog.

By Elham Saeidinezhad

It has long been tempting for economists to imagine “the economy” as a giant machine for producing and distributing “value.” Finance, on this view, is just the part of the device that takes the output that is not consumed by end-users (the “savings”) and redirects it back to the productive parts of the machine (as “investment”). Our financial system is an ornate series of mechanisms to collect the value we’ve saved up and invest it into producing yet more value. Financial products of all sorts—including money itself—are just the form that value takes when it is in the transition from savings to investment. What matters is the “real” economy—where the money is the veil, and the things of value are produced and distributed.

What if this were exactly backwards? What if money and finance were understood not as the residuum of past economic activity—as a thing among other things—but rather as the way humans manage ongoing relationships between each other in a world of fundamental uncertainty? These are the sorts of questions asked by the economist Perry Mehrling (and Hyman Minsky before him). These inquiries provided a framework that has allowed him to answer many of the issues that mystify neoclassical economics.

On Mehrling’s “Money View,” every (natural or artificial) person engaged in economic activity is understood in terms of her financial position, that is, in terms of the obligations she owes others (her “liabilities”) and the obligations owed to her (her “assets”). In modern economies, obligations primarily take the form of money and credit instruments. Every actor must manage the inflow and outflow of obligations (called “cash flow management”) such that she can settle up with others when her obligations to them come due. If she can, she is a “going concern” that continues to operate normally. If she cannot, she must scramble to avoid some form of financial failure—bankruptcy being the most common. After all, as Mehrling argues, “liquidity kills you quick.” This “survival constraint” binds not only today but also at every moment in the future. Thus, generally, the problem of satisfying the survival constraint is a problem of matching up the time pattern of assets (obligations owed to an actor) with the time pattern of liabilities (obligations an actor owed to others). The central question is whether, at any moment in time, there is enough cash inflow to pay for the cash flows.

For the Money View, these cash flows are at the heart of the financial market. In other words, the financial system is essentially a payment system that enables the transfer of value to happen even when a debtor does not own the means of payment today. Payment takes place in two stages. When one actor promises something for another, the initial payment takes place—the thing promised is the former’s liability and the latter’s asset. When the promise is kept, the transaction is settled (or funded), and the original asset and liability are canceled.

The Hierarchy of Debt-Money

What makes finance somewhat confusing is that all the promises in question are promises to pay, which means that both the payment and the settlement process involve the transfer of financial assets. To learn when an asset is functioning as a means of payment and when it is operating as a form of settlement requires understanding that, as Mehrling has argued, “always and everywhere, monetary systems are hierarchical.” If a financial instrument is higher up the hierarchy than another, the former can be used to settle a transaction in the latter. At the top of the hierarchy is the final means of settlement—an asset that everybody within a given financial system will accept. The conventional term for this type of asset is “money.” In the modern world, money takes the form of central bank reserves—i.e., obligations issued by a state. The international monetary system dictates the same hierarchy for different state currencies, with the dollar as the top of this pyramid. What controls this hierarchy in financial instruments and differentiates money (means of final settlement) from credit (a promise to pay, a means of delaying final settlement), is their degree of “liquidness” and their closeness to the most stable money: the U.S. central bank reserves.

Instruments such as bank deposits are more money-like compared to the others since they are promises to pay currency on demand. Securities, on the other hand, are promises to pay currency over some time horizon in the future, so they are even more attenuated promises to pay. Mehrling argues that the payments system hides this hierarchy by enabling the firms to use credit today to postpone the final settlement into the future.

The Money View vs. Quantity and Portfolio Theories

Viewing the world from this perspective allows us to see details about financial markets and beyond, that the lens of neoclassical economics does not. For instance, the lack of attention to payment systems in standard monetary theories is a byproduct of overlooking the essential hierarchy of finance. Models such as Quantity Theory of Money that explore the equilibrium amount of money in the system systematically disregards the level of reserves that are required for the payment system to continuously “convert” bank deposits (which are at the lower layer of the hierarchy) into currency on demand.

Further, unlike the Money View, the Portfolio Choice Theory (such as that developed by James Tobin), which is at the heart of asset pricing models, entirely abstracts from the role of dealers in supplying market liquidity. These models assume an invisible hand that provides market liquidity for free in the capital market. From the lens of supply and demand, this is a logical conclusion. Since a supplier can always find a buyer who is willing to buy that security at a market price, there is no job for an intermediary dealer to arrange this transaction. The Money View, on the other hand, identifies the dealers’ function as the suppliers of market liquidity—the clearinghouse through which debts and credits flow—which makes them the primary determinant of asset prices.

The Search for Stable Money

The Money View’s picture of conventional monetary policy operations is very distinct from an image that a trained monetary economist has in mind. From the Money View’s perspective, throughout the credit cycle, one constant is the central bank’s job to balance elasticity and discipline in the monetary system as a way of controlling the flow of credit. What shapes the dynamic of elasticity and discipline in the financial system is the daily imbalances in payment flows and the need of every agent in the system to meet a “survival” or “reserve constraint.”

In normal times, if a central bank, such as the Fed, wants to tighten, it raises the federal fund target. Raising the cost of the most liquid form of money in the system will then resonate down the monetary hierarchy. It immediately lowers the profitability of money market dealers (unless the term interest rate rises by the full amount). Because money market dealers set the funding cost for dealers in capital markets (i.e. because they are a level up in the hierarchy of money), capital market dealers will face pressure to raise asset prices and long-term interest rates. These security dealers are willing to hold existing security inventories only at a lower price, hence higher expected profit. Thus the centrally determined price of money changes the value of stocks.

Central Bankers as Shadow Bankers

The Money View’s can also help us see how the essence of credit has shifted from credit that runs through regulated banks to “market-based credit” through a shadow banking system that provides money market funding for capital market investing. Shadow banking system faces the same problems of liquidity and solvency risk that the traditional banking system faces, but without the government backstops at the top of the hierarchy (via Fed lender of last resort payouts and FDIC deposit insurance). Instead, the shadow banking system relies mainly on dealers in derivatives and in wholesale lending. Having taken on responsibility for financing the shadow banks, which financed the subprime mortgage market, these dealers began to run into problems during the financial crisis. Mehrling argues that the reality of the financial system dictates Fed to reimagine its role from a lender last resort to banks to the dealer of last resort to the shadow banking system.

Conclusion

We have been living in the Money View world, a world where almost everything that matters happens in the present. Ours is a world in which cash inflows must be adequate to meet cash outflows (the survival or liquidity constraint) for a single day. This is a period that is too short for creating any elasticity or discipline in production or consumption, the usual subject matter of economics, so we have abstracted from them. Doing so has blinded us to many important aspects of the system we live in. In our world, “the present determines the present.”

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Is the Recent Buyback Spree Creating Liquidity Problems for the Dealers?

“You are a side effect,” Van Houten continued, “of an evolutionary process that cares little for individual lives. You are a failed experiment in mutation.”


― John Green, The Fault in Our Stars

By Elham Saeidinezhad

The anxiaties about large financial corporations’ debt-funded payouts- aka “stock buybacks”- is reemerging a decade after the financial crisis. Companies on the S&P 500 have poured more than $5.3 trillion into repurchasing their own shares since 2010. The root cause of most concerns is that stock buybacks do not contribute to the productive capacities of the firm. Indeed, these distributions to stockholders disrupt the growth dynamic that links the productivity and pay of the labor force. Besides, these payments that come on top of dividends could weaken the firms’ credit quality. These analyses, however, fail to
appreciate the cascade effect that will hurt the dealers’ liquidity positions due to higher stock prices. Understanding this side effect has become even more significant as the share of major financial corporations, including JPMorgan, are trading at records, and are getting very expensive. That high-class problem should concern dealers who are providing market liquidity for these stocks and establishing short positions in the process. Dealers charge a fee to handle trades between the buyers and
sellers of securities. Higher stock prices make it more expensive for short selling dealers to settle the positions by repurchasing securities on the open market. If stocks become too high-priced, it might reduce dealers’ ability and willingness to provide market liquidity to the system. This chain of events that threatens the state of market liquidity is missing from the standard analysis of share buybacks. 

At the very heart of the discussion about share buybacks lay the question of how companies should use their cash. In a buyback, a company uses its cash to buy its own existing shares and becomes the biggest demander of its own stock. Firms usually repurchase their own stocks when they have surplus cash flow or earnings, which
exceed those needed to finance positive net present value investment
opportunities. The primary beneficiaries of these operations are shareholders who receive extra cash payments on top of dividends. The critical feature of stock buybacks is that it can be a self-fulfilling prophecy for the stock price. Since each remaining share gets a more significant piece of the profit and value, the companies bid up the share values and boost their own stock prices. The artificially high stock  prices can create liquidity andsettlement problems for the dealers who are making market for the stocks and have established short positions in the process.

Short selling is used by market makers to provide market liquidity in
response to unanticipated demand or to hedge the risk of a long position in the same security or a related security. On the settlement date, when the contract expires, the dealer must closeout- or settle- the
position by returning the borrowed security to the stock lender, typically by purchasing securities on the open market. If the prices
become too high, they will not have enough capital to secure their short sales. At this point, whoever clears their trade will force them to liquidate. If they continue losing money, dealers face severe liquidity problems, and they may go bankrupt. The result would be an illiquid market. To sum up, in recent years, buybacks by public firms have become an essential technique for distributing earnings to shareholders. Not surprisingly, this trend has started a heated debate amongst the critiques. The problem, however, is that most analyzes have failed to capture the effect of these operations on dealers’ market-making capacity, and the state of market liquidity, when share prices become too high. 

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When it Comes to Sovereign Debt, What is the Real Concern? Level or Liquidity?

“What can be added to the happiness of a man who is in health, out of debt, and has a clear conscience?” Adam Smith

By Elham Saeidinezhad

The anxieties around the European debt crisis (often also referred to as eurozone crisis) seems to be a thing of the past. Eurozone sovereigns have secured record-high order books for their new government bond issues. However, emerging balance-sheet constraints have limited the primary dealers’ ability to stay in the market and might support the view that sovereign bond liquidity is diminishing. The standard models of sovereign default identify the origins of a sovereign debt crisis to be bad “fundamentals,” such as high debt levels and expectations. These models ignore the critical features of market structures, such as liquidity and primary dealers, that underlie these fundamentals. Primary dealers – the banks appointed by national debt agencies to help them borrow from investors- act as market makers in government bond auctions. These primary dealers provide market liquidity and set the price of government bonds. Most recently, however, primary dealers are leaving Europe’s bond markets due to increased pressure on their balance sheets. These exits could decrease sovereign bonds’ liquidity and increase the cost of borrowing for the governments. It can sow the seeds of the next financial crisis in the process. Put it differently, primary dealers’ decision to exit from this market might be acting as a warning sign of a new crisis in the making. 

Standard economic theories emphasize the role of bad fundamentals such as high debt levels in creating expectations of government default and reaching to a bad-equilibrium. The sentiment is that the sovereign debt crisis is a self-fulfilling catastrophe in nature that is caused by market expectations of default on sovereign debt. In other words, governments can be subjected to the same dynamics of fickle expectations that create run on the banks and destabilize banks. This is particularly true when a government borrows from the capital market over whom it has relatively little influence. Mathematically, this implies that high debt levels lead to “multiple equilibria” in which the debt level might not be sustainable. Therefore, there will not be a crisis as long as the economy reaches a good equilibrium where no default is expected, and the interest rate is the risk-free rate. The problem with these models is that they put so much weight on the role of expectations and fundamentals while entirely abstract from specific market characteristics and constituencies such as market liquidity and dealers.

Primary dealers use their balance-sheets to determine bond prices and the cost of borrowing for the governments. In doing so, they create market liquidity for the bonds. Primary dealers buy government bonds directly from a government’s debt management office and help governments raise money from investors by pricing and selling debt. They typically are also entrusted with maintaining secondary trading activity, which entails holding some of those bonds on their balance sheets for a period. In Europe, several billion euros of European government bonds are sold every week to primary dealers through auctions, which they then sell on. However, tighter regulations, such as MiFID II, since the financial crisis has made primary dealing less profitable because of the extra capital that banks now must hold against possible losses. Also, the European Central Bank’s €2.6tn quantitative easing program has meant national central banks absorbed large volumes of debt and lowered the supply of the bonds. These factors lead the number of primary dealers in 11 EU countries to be the lowest since Afme began collecting data in 2006. 

This decision by the dealers to exit the market can increase the cost of borrowing for the governments and decrease sovereign bonds’ liquidity. As a result, regardless of the type of equilibrium, the economy is at, and what the debt level is, the dealers’ decision to leave the market could reduce governments’ capacity to repay or refinance their debt without the support of third parties like the European Central Bank (ECB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Economics models that study the sovereign debt crisis abstracts from the role of primary dealers in government bonds. Therefore, it should hardly be surprising to see that these models would not be able to warn us about a future crisis that is rooted in the diminished liquidity in the sovereign debt market.

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Is Debt a Sin?

By Elham Saeidinezhad

“Oh, sinnerman, where you gonna run to?
Sinnerman where you gonna run to?
Where you gonna run to?
All on that day
We got to run to the rock”
Nina Simone

In the recent world bank report published in the first week of January, the Washington D.C.-based group said there had been four waves of government debt accumulation over the last 50 years. In 2018, for instance, global debt climbed to a record high of about 230% of gross domestic product (GDP). The critical drivers of the national debt level are government expenditures on welfare programs such as health insurance, education, and social security. The report, aligned with the premises of standard macroeconomic theories, warns that these episodes will not have a happy ending. The recommendation, therefore, is to reduce these public programs.  The issue is that these results are generated by unrealistic assumptions about interest rates and the economics of financial institutions that motivates supply-demand frameworks. Once we consider more sensible assumptions about interest rates and financial institutions’ business models, there might be a more happy ending for governments’ initiatives to support welfare programs.

To elaborate on this point, let’s start by understanding the “Market for loanable funds” model that is the most preliminary yet well-known supply and demand framework to study the effects of government debt. This theory predicts that higher government budget deficit reduces national saving, which is the source of the supply of loanable funds. Because the public debt does not influence the amount that households and firms want to borrow to finance investment at any given interest rate, it does not alter the demand for loans. As a result, the supply-demand framework suggests that in the new equilibria, the interest rate will rise. Higher interest rates, in return, crowd out private investment by increasing borrowing costs. This process will create a vicious cycle that undermines economic growth since investment is one of the main components of aggregate output.

The challenge is that these models are based on very unreliable assumptions. First, they assume that there is only one type of financial institution in the market for loans. These institutions’ only resource to make these loans is the savers’ money. In reality, however, rather than being merely an intermediary between the savers and the borrowers, financial institutions use their balance sheets to create different types of private credit.  Further, these theories propose that demand and supply forces in the credit market are the primary determinant of the interest rate. In modern economies, nevertheless, the interest rate is set by the ability and willingness of these institutions to use their balance sheets and continue making the market for new loans. This ability depends on factors such as their access to short-term funding rather than supply and demand forces. To sum up, once we take more realistic assumptions into account, we might find a happier ending for governments’ decisions to finance programs such as health insurance and unemployment benefit that enhance public welfare.

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Is the Fed Losing Steam in Controlling Interest Rate?

By Elham Saeidinezhad

As the final countdown to bring in 2020 begins, new concerns have emerged regarding the Fed’s continuous ability to control the interest rate. Developments in the financial market such as growing U.S. budget deficit, investors’ increased cash hoarding desire, and pressures on the money market rates such as repo rates are urging these fears.  The sentiment is that the Fed’s control over interest rate determines the price of reserves, which in turn eliminates any form of excess supply or excess demand in the market for reserve. In doing so, the Fed maintains its authority to stabilize the money market where the price of short-term funding is determined. The problem is that in modern finance, most financial participants finance their liquidity requirements mainly through selling their securities holdings, or using them as collateral, rather than demanding for reserves directly.  In other words, the availability of market liquidity, which refers to the ability to raise some money by selling holdings of financial assets, has a higher priority than the supply of reserves. Therefore, as Perry Mehrling argues, and this blog highlights, the central bank watchers’ focus should deviate from the Fed’s ability to control the price of reserves, which is federal funds rate, to its ability to affect market and funding liquidity. This also entails an intellectual migration from a supply and demand framework toward a Flow of Funds accounting perspective.

To understand this point, let’s start by understanding the standard monetary economics view of the interest rate. In this framework, the money rate of interest is determined directly by the supply and demand for state money or reserves. The idea is that the Fed can accurately target the federal funds rate to control supply and demand for the money even though this interbank lending rate is determined in the market. The notion that the reserve balances held at the Fed are the ultimate means of interbank settlement gives the Fed this power. This sentiment of “monetary liquidity” got upheld in postwar economic discussion. The further integration of the money supply and demand framework with the “Liquidity preference” framework of Keynes made it an integral part of the standard economist’s toolkit. The issue is that this analytical strategy overlooks the role of borrowing and private credit in the money market by treating the money rate of interest as determined directly by the supply and demand for reserves. In modern finance, however, the dishoarding of money balances is only one way of satisfying the liquidity needs when cash outflow (use of funds) is larger than cash inflow (source of funds).

The other two methods are borrowing or selling financial assets. The former requires access to “funding liquidity,” and the latter involves the availability of “market liquidity.” More importantly, the dealers supply both liquidities. Banks provide funding liquidity by acting as dealers in the money market and earning the spread between overnight rate and term rates. In the process, they set the price of funding liquidity which is the short-term interest rate. Securities dealers, on the other hand, provide market liquidity and determine asset prices by taking on price risk and making the inside spread, which is the difference between the bid and ask prices. In doing so, both dealers take the deficit players’ settlement issues onto their own balance sheets and set short-term and long-term interest rates respectively. To sum up, it is crucial to observe that first, liquidity is a form of credit, not reserve money. Second, the interest rate, or price of liquidity, is determined by the expansion of dealer balance sheets on both sides rather than supply and demand for reserves.